ON MARCH 18th the clock started ticking for Dilma Rousseff. The lower house of Brazil’s Congress voted to start the impeachment process against the president, who has until early April to present her defence. She faces charges of using accounting trickery to hide the true size of the budget deficit. Her congressional foes plan to put forward a second motion based on allegations that relate more directly to the main scandal that threatens her future: a former ally claims that she tried to obstruct a wide-ranging investigation into a multibillion-dollar bribery scheme at Petrobras, the state-controlled oil giant, from which her left-wing Workers’ Party (PT) profited.
As congressmen in Brasília, the capital, cast their votes, 300,000-odd PT supporters swept onto the streets across the country in support of their embattled leader. But before the crowds dispersed, the president suffered another setback. The appointment as minister of her wily predecessor, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, was blocked by a supreme-court judge.

Thus ended the most eventful and oddest 72 hours in recent Brazilian history. They leave the president weakened, possibly fatally. The reputation of her once-revered predecessor is in tatters (see article). That of the crusading judge leading the Petrobras investigation, Sérgio Moro, has been damaged, too. The country, which is suffering its worst recession since the 1930s, is angry and bewildered.
The latest furore began on March 16th, when Ms Rousseff named Lula as her chief of staff—a position she once held under him. She needed “a skilful political negotiator” by her side, she explained, which is no doubt true. But most Brazilians think she hired Lula to give him the immunity from prosecution in ordinary courts that Brazilian law grants to members of cabinet. Mr Moro is investigating whether he benefited from the shakedown of Petrobras, which appears to have started while he was president from 2003 to 2010. Earlier this month police briefly detained him for questioning. Lula denies any wrongdoing.
The anger of the government’s foes was fuelled by a telephone conversation between the former and current presidents, released by Mr Moro on March 16th. In it, the president tells her mentor that she will send a nomination letter for him to sign “if necessary”, which many interpreted as proof of a conspiracy to avoid justice. Anti-government protests erupted in several cities; in Brasília the night sky was lit up with burning tyres. The president’s office said the conversation was merely a reference to Lula’s possible absence from the swearing-in ceremony the next day. He attended the event, but was in office for a matter of hours before Gilmar Mendes, a supreme-court justice, suspended his appointment.
The government is appealing against Mr Mendes’s ruling to the full tribunal. Ms Rousseff’s allies have also vowed to seek judicial redress against Mr Moro, who unsealed the wiretaps in “flagrant violation of the law and constitution”. Many lawyers agree that he erred in releasing recordings in which one party—the president no less—is not under formal investigation and enjoys strong constitutional protection. The controversial exchange was recorded after Mr Moro had ordered the police to stop tapping Lula’s phone. One supreme-court justice chastised the judge for “leaving the law by the wayside”.
In theory the weight of evidence against Ms Rousseff, who denies all wrongdoing, will determine her fate in Congress. In practice political passions will play a big role. A poll published last weekend found that 68% of Brazilians favour impeachment. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, a former president who long believed that impeachment would set a dangerous precedent, now supports it. “That is what the streets clamour for,” he told a newspaper. A record 3.6m people marched earlier this month to demand Ms Rousseff’s fall.
The passion of Dilma Rousseff
On March 16th the Brazilian Republican Party decided to leave Ms Rousseff’s coalition—depriving her of 22 centrist votes. The Progressive Party, with 55 legislators, may do the same. More worrying for Ms Rousseff, her biggest coalition partner, the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB), led by Brazil’s vice-president, Michel Temer, may also leave. It is to decide on March 29th.
Several PMDB bigwigs have already declared themselves in favour of impeachment. Brasília is abuzz with talk of a Temer-led government of national unity, which would include Mr Cardoso’s centre-right Party of Brazilian Social Democracy (though not the former president himself). When this week Mr Temer denied any negotiations on such an alliance were taking place, few believed him.

Ms Rousseff’s chances of winning support from 172 of the 513 federal deputies—the number needed to stop the lower house from referring the impeachment motion to the Senate for trial—are diminishing. The upper house, too, appears hostile to the president. It is likely to accept for consideration any impeachment motion referred by the lower house, the chamber’s Speaker, Renan Calheiros, reportedly said. This could happen by mid-April. Ms Rousseff would then have to leave office for up to 180 days while the Senate deliberates. Mr Temer would take over. If the Senate impeaches her, Mr Temer would probably govern until the after next election in 2018.
He would inherit a mess. GDP is expected to shrink by 4% in 2016 for the second year running. Inflation of more than 10% is reducing real wages. The unemployment rate has nearly doubled since 2014 (though it is still less than 10%). One in five young Brazilians is without work; economists warn of a “lost generation”. Brazil is no Venezuela: some export-oriented industries are thriving thanks to the weak currency (see article). But for most companies and workers the outlook is grim.
Confidence will return only if the government reduces the budget deficit. At nearly 11% of GDP, it keeps interest rates high and has pushed public debt to what for Brazil is an unsustainable level, of 70% of GDP. Ms Rousseff’s proposals to cut spending and raise taxes are stuck in Congress—partly because her party opposes them. If that does not change, the government will miss this year’s unambitious target for a primary budget surplus (excluding interest payments) of 0.5% of GDP. Samuel Pessoa of IBRE-FGV, a think-tank, forecasts a “recurring” primary deficit (not counting one-off revenues) of a record 2.5% of GDP. It is time for politics to help the economy, the largely powerless finance minister, Nelson Barbosa, pleaded forlornly.
Financial markets are pinning their hopes on a new government. If Mr Temer takes over at the head of a national-unity coalition, a stronger finance minister could push through emergency measures, such as a levy on financial transactions, to reduce the budget deficit. Share prices in São Paulo have risen by 25% since late February as odds of that happening have improved.
Most Brazilians do not share this enthusiasm. Just one in six thinks a government led by Mr Temer would be any good. That is understandable. Six PMDB congressmen are being investigated in the Petrobras affair, including Mr Calheiros and the lower-house Speaker, Eduardo Cunha, whom the supreme court indicted for corruption earlier this month. Nearly 60% of Congress’s 594 members face criminal accusations, from presenting dodgy electoral accounts to homicide. Whether Ms Rousseff stays or goes they could remain in office until after an election in 2018. The renewal Brazilians yearn for is years away.